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Reply

Re-Marking the Progress in Frischmann
Lawrence Lessigt
Simple ideas fix public policy. Simple ideas, taken for
granted, by a generation that rules. These ideas were learned.
They did not come naturally. They were taught on the basis of
the best that was known, at the time this generation last
learned. They are not argued for. They are not disputed. They
set the background against which public policy decisions get
made.
There is a set of simple ideas that now guides telecommunications policy. At its core is a view about the utility of regulation. Regulation, this view holds, is disfavored. More precisely,
a very good reason is needed if private ordering is to be disturbed. Thus, markets should be left alone unless some strong
reason for intervention is shown. Market failure alone is not
sufficient since government failure can defeat any gain that
government intervention might seek.
I agree with these simple ideas. But I also believe that with
respect to networks, there is a gap in our understanding about
when regulation makes sense. There is not yet a good theory for
explaining this gap, nor will there be one until economists
frame such a theory in their own language. For now, there is
only a set of powerful intuitions, but powerful intuitions do not
compete with simple ideas.
Brett Frischmann takes this debate beyond powerful intuitions. In An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and Commons
the
Management, Frischmann offers a model for understanding
1 His model
networks.
infrastructure of telecommunications
teaches a different communications policy than that schooled
t John A. Wilson Distinguished Faculty Scholar and Executive Director
of the Center for Internet and Society, Stanford Law School. Copyright © 2005
by Lawrence Lessig.
1. Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure and
Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917 (2005).
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by simple ideas. It shows us the value in regulating these networks differently.
This is an important lesson to learn. The United States
continues to fall behind other major industrial nations in
broadband penetration. Today, we are thirteenth.2 Part of the
difference between us and these other nations is our attitude
about the government's place in securing broadband penetration. We have left the matter solely to private actors whereas
other nations have supplemented private action with government support. Our policy fits the reigning simple ideas about
how such markets work. Frischmann's article shows us the
possible error in these simple ways.
My aim in this Reply is to summarize and extend. Frischmann's article is rich and complex. Frischmann clears the way
for important new work in economics. I point to some additional work left to be done.
I. NONRIVALROUS RESOURCES AND INFRASTRUCTURE
Resources are different, and rivalrousness is one dimension
of difference. For some resources, their consumption rivals the
opportunity for others to consume the same resource. For other
resources, it does not. If you drink my coffee, I cannot. Coffee is
rival. If I recite your poem, that does not interfere with your
opportunity to recite the same poem. Poems are not rival.
One simple idea that has captured a generation of policy
makers is that nonrivalry creates trouble. 3 The trouble is not
static. Instead, it affects the resource's supply. Nonrival (NR)
resources invite free riding. 4 And if the resource is the sort that
needs effort to create-if it is songs rather than sunshine-then
free riding can sap the incentives needed to supply the NR resource. If you can free ride off of what I create, then my incentive to create is less than it would be if you paid for the benefit
you received. Because of free riding, I create less. Free riding

2. See Int'l Telecomm. Union, ITU Strategy and Policy Unit Newslog, at
http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/newslog/2004/09/ (Sept. 15, 2004).
3. Frischmann extends this concept of nonrivalry to include partially
nonrival (NR) resources. See Frischmann, supra note 1, at 942-56. This concept is an important part of the analysis he provides, but it is unnecessary for
the purposes of my summary. Wherever I describe NR resources, one could
substitute "nonrival and partially nonrival resources."
4. Technically, as Frischmann explains, free riding requires that the NR
resource also be nonexcludable. See Frischmann, supra note 1, at 947-49. In
the ordinary case, absent regulation or private effort, they are.
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thus costs something, its name notwithstanding. It costs the incentive that would otherwise exist had there been payment for
the benefit, and that cost reduces its supply.
The proper response to a cost is to find a way to eliminate
it. The standard response is to eliminate free riding by granting
an exclusive right. If access to the resource can be made conditional-if excludability can be engineered into the frame-then
access to the resource can be conditioned on paying for the
benefit. The marginal incentive to produce can be preserved if
exclusive rights can be secured.
This is a perfectly fine solution for some resources. In particular, it is a fine solution for consumption goods. If the NR resource is simply meant to be consumed, then there is a benefit
to solving the free rider problem (to align incentives) and not
much cost. There is, however, some cost-the cost of whatever
mechanism is invoked to solve the free-riding problem. So long
as the benefit to incentives outweighs that cost, it makes sense
to restrict the NR resource to those who are willing to pay.
So much is commonplace among the simple ideas that I referred to at the start. But it is here that Frischmann begins
drawing his map. He helps to distinguish cases where the ordinary solution (stop free riding) works, and cases where it might
not. Some resources are meant to be consumed (consumption
goods). Other resources are inputs into the production or creation of other goods; these resources are intermediate, and they
complicate the question of whether the ordinary solution to the
free-riding problem is really a helpful solution. For if these intermediate goods are used to create other goods, then blocking
access to them through an exclusive right could block the creation of these other goods. The cost of solving the free-riding
problem is therefore not just the cost of the mechanism that
solves that problem. Rather, the cost now includes the loss produced by not being able to create these other goods.
There is a simple response, however, to this potential loss.
If the NR resource is an input to some other good, then for the
same reason that NR-consumption resources can be regulated
by the market, NR-input resources could be regulated by the
market as well. The consumer of that second good could simply
pay the price necessary to assure access to the input. The problem is the same as the NR-consumption good, one step removed.
For example, imagine that an advertising agency wants a
jingle for a new campaign. It invites composers to submit songs.
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As with any creative work, such songs would be NR resourcesonce composed, they could be consumed by others without diminishing the amount available to anyone else. If nothing protected my composition, then you could copy it, and undercut me
in selling it to the agency. 5 To solve that problem, the law gives
me an exclusive right (a copyright) once I compose my song.
You then can no longer (legally) free ride on my work.
On paper, however, my song is not really worth anything to
the advertising agency. Its value is made possible when someone records it. The composition itself therefore is a consumption
good. The composition is an input (in the notation I have developed here, a NR-input). Thus, the exclusive right the law gives
me might be thought to create a barrier for the musicians who
would record it. They now cannot get access (legally) unless
they pay me.
But that is not a barrier within a market economy. It is a
means for allocating the NR-input to its highest valued users.
My good may be an input, but those who need the input can
pay me for it. It is a NR resource, and even an intermediate
good, but the property law does not interfere with any creativity. Again, so long as the gain in incentives to me outweighs the
cost of the restrictions, both primary and secondary, solving the
free rider problem makes sense.
Among NR-inputs, there is a further distinction to draw. A
subset of all NR-inputs has one further feature: they are generic rather than specific inputs to the creation of other goods.
Such NR-generic-inputs feed many different ultimate goods.
These ultimate goods can be both commercial and noncommercial. It is these NR-generic-inputs that Frischmann suggests we
call "infrastructure."6 Infrastructure is thus that set of intermediate goods for which three conditions are true: the resource
is (1) NR; (2) an input into some other good; and (3) an input
into "a wide range of goods and services, including private
goods, public goods and nonmarket goods." 7
It is the third condition that creates a potential problem for
the standard solution to the free-riding problem. Remember
that the solution to the second condition was premised on a
well-functioning market. Giving a property right to my NR-

5.
would
6.
7.

Your price would drive toward your marginal cost, zero, yet that price
be far below the costs it took me to compose the song.
Frischmann, supra note 1, at 956.
Id.
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input was no barrier so long as a market could properly regulate access by other goods. The third condition creates the possibility that this market will not function well. If the NR-input
is sufficiently generic, and if it is an input into a sufficiently diverse range of goods, then the market will not regulate access
to the good well. An exclusive right in these cases may do more
harm than good. The opportunity cost of restricting access, in
other words, may outweigh any gain.
There is an even further distinction to be drawn here. If an
infrastructure is a NR-generic-input, then infrastructures can
be of three different kinds. There could be infrastructures that
feed exclusively commercial goods, and resources that feed public and social goods in addition to commercial goods. If the NRgeneric-input feeds public and social goods, then our reasons
for being sanguine about the restrictive effect of an exclusive
right disappear. Again, the exclusive right is (relatively) costless if and only if there is a market to regulate it. But NRgeneric-inputs that supply social and public goods are infrastructures that cannot depend on a market to regulate them.
The nature of these ultimate goods means markets will either
be absent or incomplete. Hence, the opportunity cost of an exclusive right may be greater than its benefit.
Again, if the infrastructure exclusively supports commercial goods, then the market may adequately regulate its supply.
Antitrust concerns may infect that regulation, and antitrust
law must therefore continue to police such markets. But if
there is no antitrust concern, then there is no reason not to
leave this resource to the market. It will, as well as any mechanism would, reckon the value that would produce the necessary
incentives.
We are thus at the end of the string of careful distinctions
that sets up the argument that Frischmann's article delivers.
Figure 1 maps these distinctions.
Each diamond marks a distinction. Resources are either rival or NR. If they are NR, they are either consumption or intermediate. If they are intermediate, they are either specific or
generic. If they are generic, they support either commercial
goods exclusively, or public or social goods as well. The column
on the left includes those categories for which the market is
8
presumptively an adequate mechanism. The row at the bottom

8. Presumptively, because they all must be regulated by the principles of
antitrust.
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contains those goods for which even well-functioning markets
would fail to adequately value the resource. Finally, the larger
of the two boxes at the bottom includes all goods properly considered infrastructure.
Figure 1: Mapping Infrastructure
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Careful analysis thus identifies the category of infrastructure that motivates Frischmann's normative argument. That
argument, in turn, comes in two parts.
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II. INFRASTRUCUTRE, OPEN ACCESS, AND MARKET
FAILURE
I have compressed rich detail into a very simple map. The
map is no substitute for the detail. The map, however, helps
speed identification of the types of infrastructure that presumptively would suffer market failure. Call that category
"type C infrastructure." That category sets the stage for
Frischmann's central, normative point: type C infrastructure
should be supplied through an open access regime. 9
The first part of that claim-that type C infrastructure suffers market failure-will be uncontroversial enough if we think
about traditional examples of this infrastructure. Roads, telephone networks, and governance systems are all NR-genericinputs that feed both commercial and noncommercial ends. To
the extent that they serve noncommercial ends, the ability of
the market to adequately reckon infrastructure supply is
drawn into doubt-that is the market failure. With each of
these traditional resources, there is a long history of the government playing a central role in assuring the resource supply.
As illustrated in figure 1, Frischmann's map shows how
that tradition generalizes: more infrastructure than traditional
infrastructure will present the same market failure. If highways are infrastructure, then we can see why the information
superhighway is infrastructure. If information highways are
type C infrastructure, then we can see why they too would present market failure.
This is not the end of Frischmann's argument, but even
here, important conclusions about current policy debates
emerge. Frischmann points to one such debate in a note at the
very end of his article. 10 This is the story of wireless broadband
in Philadelphia.
The City of Philadelphia announced a program to fund the
deployment of a wireless Internet infrastructure within the
city." More than forty percent of Philadelphia neighborhoods
had no access to broadband Internet. 12 Thus, this collective re-

9.

Frischmann, supra note 1, at 1020-22.

10. See id. at 1021 n.406.
11. Id.
12. See Matt Lake, Is Municipal Wi-Fi Doomed in the United States?,
CNET REVIEWS, Jan. 18, 2005, at http://reviews.cnet.com/4520-6028_7-56213
67.html.
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sponse seemed fairly sensible to anyone believing that Internet
access is an important social and economic good.
Yet before the project could even begin, the state legislature passed a law, promoted heavily by private network providers, that banned municipalities from providing wireless broadband connectivity. 13 That law responded to a simple idea: if the
market could supply a good, the government need not, and
therefore, should not provide that good.
Frischmann's analysis shows us why that conclusion does
not follow. The market will undoubtedly provide some broadband access. If Internet access, however, is a form of type C infrastructure-as it plainly is-then the access that the market
provides will be less than what is socially optimal. Just as private roads would be fewer than public, or United Parcel Service
(UPS) would be more restrictive than the U.S. Postal Service,
Internet provided exclusively by a private market is likely to be
access that is socially inadequate.
III. EVALUATING OPEN ACCESS AND GOVERNMENT
REGULATION
So far there is little in Frischmann's account that I would
criticize, and there is even less with which I disagree. It is
Frischmann's final proposition, however, that is the most important to his argument, and this final proposition is not yet
proven.
Type C infrastructure, Frischmann demonstrates, presents
a market failure. That failure invites us to interrogate other
mechanisms by which type C infrastructure might be regulated. Frischmann describes two alternatives: government
regulation and open access. Either would value type C infrastructure differently than the market. In principle, both could
better optimize access to type C infrastructure. Thus, to carry
Frischmann's argument to its final point, we need a way to
know which alternative-open access or government-is better.
Now, of course, the simple idea that I described at the start
is enough to bias this question in Frischmann's favor. But
Frischmann cannot rely on that simple idea. He needs something more to map the conditions under which one solution is
superior to the other. Yet the argument so far offers little more
than a sketch.

13. Id.
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Consider a particular recommendation that Frischmann
discusses: the regulation of access to the Internet. The Internet
is plainly type C infrastructure. It follows from the argument
summarized in Part II that we cannot rely on the market alone
to determine access to such a resource. The market will undervalue the social value of such a network. More importantly, the
market would skew the development of the network because it
could not see such alternative value. An alternative regulator is
required, and the question is which regulator is proper.
Frischmann picks open access as the regulator, by which
he means a regime that assures that the network will remain
open for any application or any content to compete equally on
this network. Such competition is the consequence of the Internet's end-to-end design. Frischmann argues-rightly, it seems
to me-that we should preserve this end-to-end design.
But we have not yet seen the argument that proves that intuition. Frischmann points to two alternatives that, from his
perspective, would be inferior. 14 Neither the market alone, nor
the government, could do the work that end-to-end performs.
At least the government should not subsidize applications because the government is bad at picking winners. The market
should not do it, at least where last generation's winners could
veto their own competition. These market and government failures lead Frischmann to recommend something else: open access.
Again, I agree with the conclusion, but we will need more
to convince those who do not. There is no doubt a cost to either
the government or the market in making this choice. But we
need a clearer sense of the parameters for deciding when open
access is a solution. Moreover, we need a better way to measure
the benefit. Put differently, what is the sensitivity of this particular conclusion? On what does it depend? What would make
it different? 15
IV. END-TO-END, "INNOVATION," AND
INFRASTRUCTURE
Finally, let me consider the one part of Frischmann's argument where he means to disagree with what I have written. I
am not convinced that we have a meaningful disagreement.
14.
15.

Frischmann, supra note 1, at 1020-22.
I point to some relevant factors in LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF

IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 89-93 (2001).
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Frischmann's argument ends with the type C infrastructure that currently presents the most hotly contested policy
battles, the Internet. As Frischmann describes, the Internet
was born with an end-to-end architecture. 16 That architecture
shifts intelligence in this network to the ends, or edge, so far as
that is possible, and seeks to keep the network itself as simple
as possible. The original motivation for that design was
adaptability. A large, decentralized network would grow most
easily if network owners did not need to approve every service
designed for this network. End-to-end thus became the moniker
by which this commitment to network simplicity is described.
However, as Barbara van Schewick demonstrates, there
have been at least two end-to-end arguments in the history of
the network. 17 Both arguments describe where functionality
should be placed in the network. The first and more technical
determines placement on the basis of necessity.' 8 This argument maintains that functionality that could only be performed
completely at the edge of the network should not be placed
within its core. 19 That requirement later became more of a policy: there was a general preference that functionality be shifted
to the edge, even if in principle, it could live in the core.
Understood as policy rather than rule, the end-to-end principle is a thumb on the scale of any network design. All things
being equal, the policy says, select an end-to-end design over
one that is not. In some versions, the policy is more constitutional: like the First Amendment imposes a strong preference
against speech regulation, end-to-end imposes a strong preference against designs that interfere with it.
Frischmann strongly favors this end-to-end principle, as do
I. He rightly links this technical design to an infrastructure
commons that it produces. Tim Wu and I reach a similar conclusion, but for different reasons: our focus is the innovation
that such a design encourages, and policies to protect end-toend, in turn, are defended on the basis of this innovation. 20
16.
17.

Frischmann, supra note 1, at 1012.
See generally Barbara van Schewick, Architecture & Innovation: The

Role of the End-to-End Arguments in the Internet (2004) (unpublished Degree
of Dr. Ing. dissertation, Technical University of Berlin) (on file with author).
18. Id. at 116-23.
19. Id.
20. Letter from Timothy Wu, Associate Professor, University of Virginia
School of Law, & Lawrence Lessig, Professor of Law, Stanford Law School, to
Marlene H. Dortch, Secretary, FCC 3 n.3 (Aug. 22, 2003), available at http:/!
faculty.virginia.edu/timwu/wu-lessig-fcc.pdf.
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Frischmann, however, argues that "innovation" is too narrow.2 1 It connotes to him commercial innovation only. And, of

course, as commercial infrastructure is the weakest ground on
which to argue that there is market failure, it would weaken
the argument for end-to-end to see it solely in commercial
terms. Something broader is at stake, Frischmann maintains.
Not just innovation, but infrastructure.
But I do not see innovation as tied to commerce at all. Indeed, in the sense I use the term, the most important Internet
innovations have very little to do with commerce. Blogs, wikis,
and even Internet Relay Chat, are all innovations enabled by
the end-to-end architecture of the Internet. My aim is to preserve the opportunities for these, as much as for Google or
Amazon.
Thus, this difference between us seems more semantic
than real. Beyond semantics, however, there is an importantly
underspecified part to Frischmann's argument that we should
mark, but cannot complete. How should the end-to-end commons be preserved? What norm, or rule, should be imposed to
secure it?
Details matter here. Policy debates have bounced between
two very different strategies. One, which was familiar in the
late 1990s, is the open access strategy. Open access in this
sense was the specific requirement of network owners that they
enable interconnection by competitors to their physical infrastructure. Thus, open access was the principle under which
Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) providers could compete to get
access to the wire owned by the telephone company. The law
last-mile copper share
was held to require that the owners of 22
access to the customers at the other end.

The aim of this requirement was competition in access providers. Such competition, it was thought, would disrupt the
conditions under which it would make sense for network providers to interfere with end-to-end. Open access was thus an
indirect means to preserving end-to-end; it was not itself endto-end.
A second strategy for preserving the Internet commons is
more recent. Promoted by the Chairman of the Federal Communications Commission, Michael Powell, this strategy would

21.
22.

Frischmann, supra note 1, at 1012-15.
Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, Open Access to Cable Modems, 22

WHITTER L. REV. 3, 27-29 (2000).
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not insist on physical interconnection. 23 Instead, it would require that network providers secure, as Powell described it,
"Internet freedoms."24 Four principles defined "Internet freedoms," but the essence of the four together is that a network
provider not bias or hinder the choice consumers have. 25 Such a
regime would assure that the network remained "neutral," in at
least one sense of that word.
Frischmann insists that no network is "neutral," which, of
course, is correct. The aim of those pursuing network neutrality, however, is not some imagined neutrality, but rather the
elimination of certain kinds of discrimination (just as most
policies favoring equality focus on rules against certain forms of
discrimination). Rules or protocols that have the purpose of tilting network functionality strategically are the target of proponents of neutrality. Scholars such as Tim Wu have outlined
relatively simple techniques that might help outline such a
26
strategy.
The choice between these two strategies is hard. The economics of physical interconnection is complex; the inherent
games are unavoidable. And more interestingly, it is not even
clear that competition in the physical layer would preserve endto-end neutrality. As van Schewick has demonstrated, under
plausible assumptions, competition at the physical layer would
not staunch incentives by network providers to bias the net27
work.
Likewise, the mechanics of a "network neutrality" policy
are not simple either. The neutral network has produced spam
and viruses, as well as instant messaging and Voice over Internet Protocol. The network begs for more discrimination, but
where and how, consistent with neutrality, is impossibly hard
to specify. More importantly, any rule that aims to specify such
neutrality needs to avoid persistent intervention in market operations. The rule needs to be clear ex ante, so ex post enforcement is feasible.
It is not my aim here to resolve this choice between open
access as a means to the end-to-end infrastructure that
23. See Michael K. Powell, PreservingInternet Freedom: Guiding Princi-

ples for the Industry, 3 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 5, 11-12 (2004).
24. Id.
25. See id.
26. See generally Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 141 (2003).
27. van Schewick, supra note 17, at 233-85.
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Frischmann and I endorse, and network neutrality as the
means to securing an end-to-end infrastructure. My aim instead is to insist that there is more to be done to resolve it.
Even after we recognize the kinds of infrastructure that need
support, and even if we were convinced that a commons was
the best way to support those infrastructures, we would be left
with the very difficult question of how we actually construct the
commons. That critical question remains unanswered.
V. CONCLUSION
Simple ideas fix public policy, but simple ideas also break
it. A simple idea about how markets in networks should function has fixed U.S. policy regulating those networks. That idea
is also slowly breaking those networks. The Internet is not cable television. The opportunity costs in allowing it to become
cable television are huge. Yet increasingly, government policy
is relaxing any regulation that might secure this infrastructure
commons. The market, alone, is thought to be a sufficient regulator.
Frischmann has cleared the way to answering that confusion. His conclusions need to be echoed in the work of economists; the model needs to be extended to resolve the questions
it does not yet answer. Frischmann has made a critical contribution to an extraordinarily important debate. We can now see
a way to prove what to our forefathers seemed intuitive-at
least until a generation of simple ideas confused that intuition.

